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Abstract: The work described in this paper aims to detect and eliminate cyber-attacks in smart grids
that disrupt the process of dynamic state estimation. This work makes use of an unsupervised
learning method, called hierarchical clustering, in an attempt to create an artificial sensor to detect
two different cyber-sabotage cases, known as false data injection and denial-of-service, during the
dynamic behavior of the power system. The detection process is conducted by using an unsupervised
learning-enhanced approach, and a decision tree regressor is then employed for removing the threat.
The dynamic state estimation of the power system is done by Kalman filters, which provide benefits
in terms of the speed and accuracy of the process. Measurement devices in utilities and buses
are vulnerable to communication interruptions between phasor measurement units and operators,
who can be easily manipulated by false data. While Kalman filters are incapable of detecting the
majority of such cyber-attacks, this article proves that the proposed unsupervised machine learning
method is able to detect more than 90 percent of the mentioned attacks. The simulation results on the
IEEE 9-bus with 3-machines and IEEE 14-bus with 5-machines systems verify the efficiency of the
proposed approach.
Keywords: cyber-attacks; dynamic state estimation; hierarchical clustering; Kalman filter;
unsupervised learning
1. Introduction
Many industries are becoming more modernized as technology advances, including
the power systems [1]. High-speed internet is being used as the primary mean of communi-
cation between various sectors of the power grid. Cyber-attacks pose a significant threat to
various industries, as technologies increasingly rely on wireless communications, and most
of the power system operations, such as energy management programs, state estimation,
optimal power flow, etc., depend on safe and reliable communications [2,3]. DSE is an
important tool for monitoring and controlling the power network, especially when the
system is performing in the transient mode [4]. DSE is an effective method to track the
behavior of the power system in the transient mode, and it usually employs Kalman filters
to perform the state estimation process. Modernized power systems, known as smart grids,
rely heavily on wireless communication, making them vulnerable to cybercriminals who
can tamper with data derived from PMUs [5]. DSE usually uses PMU data as inputs for
estimation of the dynamic behavior of the power system, and thus the communication
between PMUs and central control is of paramount importance due to vulnerability to
cyber-attacks.
Because traditional methods based on various types of Kalman filters are only effec-
tive against certain types of cyber-sabotages [5], a machine learning-enhanced method is
needed for optimizing the detection process of these attacks. In this article, clustering and
Energies 2021, 14, 5823. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14185823 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/energies
Energies 2021, 14, 5823 2 of 21
regression techniques are used to tackle these threats, and the results are compared to the
previous methods of system defense against the mentioned attacks. While the traditional
power system is transitioning to a new and more intelligent system known as the smart
grids, the threat posed by cybercriminals is unavoidable, and by injecting more sophisti-
cated attacks, linear and non-linear traditional detection techniques, such as Kalman filters,
appear to be rendered ineffective.
Kalman filters were first used in the 1970s, when the term “Dynamic State Estimation”
was introduced [6]. With the development of related techniques, more advanced filters
were used for the accurate and robust estimation of dynamic states. In recent years, some
studies emphasized that DSE fulfills an essential function in dealing with electromechanical
transient models and unknown inputs collected from PMUs [7,8]. Numerous methods
for detecting and eliminating cyber-sabotages were implemented, ranging from linear
techniques to AI-based methods [9–11]. Applying different types of Kalman filters, such as
UKF and EKF, to eliminate the malfunctions and unknown data injections was proposed in
recent years, and these filters were examined in various scenarios of cyber-attacks [11,12].
While cyber threats are increasing these days, a power system needs better preparation
for such attacks. FDI and DoS are two typical kinds of attacks, and while both FDI
and DoS consider the measurement equipment as the main target of data injection, the
former usually changes the mean value of the measured object, while the latter denies
the transmission of data. FDI poses a considerable threat to network security, and by
changing the value of the measured data, it misleads the operators via the fundamental
change in the monitored states of the system. The situation worsens when it comes to
transient electromechanical states. DoS attacks manipulate the power system observers
during the transient period of the system and may lead to huge power outages by the
incorrect decisions made by operators due to the false data injected by intruders. In 2019, a
confirmed case of cyber-attack happened in the US power grid, in which the intruders tried
to manipulate the operators by aiming some sensitive PMUs in the power network [13].
Clustering and classification techniques, on the other hand, can be used to provide a more
optimized mean of facing these cyber-attacks [2,3]. These days, numerous AI-enhanced
techniques are utilized to separate standard data from anomalous ones, which is called
anomaly detection. HC is a well-known clustering method used on continuous data and
time series [14]. Many classification techniques were proposed in the field of machine
learning. Many of them, however, are not suitable for processing challenging time series
data. DTR and neighboring techniques seem to be more useful in the case of continuous
data generated in power networks.
It is known that the Kalman filter performs well under specific conditions, such
as Gaussian-based noise [15]. However, in more complex situations, Kalman filters are
struggling to detect the outliers, especially when the measurement noise does not obey the
Gaussian assumption [16]. In [17], robust filters were implemented to tackle this problem
by using the RCKF and CKF during electromechanical transients in the power transmission
network. A non-linear control loop-based method was proposed in [18] as a technique to
detect and eliminate cyber-attacks along with risk mitigation.
Wang et al. [19] mention a Luenberger method for both cyber-attack detection and
power system isolation. In recent years, the use of AI techniques has boosted power
engineering, as demonstrated in [20] by the use of sequential hypothesis testing based on
machine learning methods. In [21], the authors propose a machine learning-aided dynamic
state estimation method, and in [22], the authors employ a variety of deep learning-based
methods to detect false data injection. Ref. [23] reviews how to control the power system
under cascading failures. In [24], a new Markov-based approach is proposed to detect
DoS attacks, while in [25], applications of extended Kalman filter is illustrated. An on-
line DSE method is proposed in [26]. Ref. [27] uses novel Kalman filters to perform DSE.
Reference [28] introduces hierarchical clustering applications for anomaly detection. Basics
of random tree for classification and regression was first introduced in [29], and in [30],
the authors used the random tree method to recovering clusters under random noise.
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In Towards Data Science, Lorraine Li used decision tree for regression and classification
problems [31], and in [32], the authors propose a power system toolbox for MATLAB.
An EKF/UKF toolbox is proposed in [33]. In [34], a toolbox named PSAT is proposed
for dynamic analysis of the power system. It is worth noting that all of the mentioned
toolboxes are employed for simulating our results in this paper.
Reference [35] proposes a machine learning-based approach to detect FDI attacks in
the power system. In [36], the authors propose a linear approach to detect cyber-attacks
and outliers in PMU-based power system state estimation, and in [37], a supervised
learning-based approach is proposed to detect DoS attacks in smart grids. Table 1 shows
a comparison of the methods studied in this article and others in the same field. As
illustrated in Table 1, this article contributes to the field in at least two ways. Firstly, it
employs two machine learning-based methods to detect and eliminate the cyber-threats.
Secondly, it draws a comparison between Kalman filters and a proposed hybrid machine
learning method for the same purpose.
Table 1. Comparison between related studies.
Features [12] [15] [17] [18] [36] [37] This Article
Supervised learning method × × × × ×
√ √
FDI attack








method × × × × × ×
√
Cyber-attack detection
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Cyber-attack elimination
√ √ √ √ √
×
√
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates models for DSE,
fourth-order generator, cyber-attacks and the two Kalman filters utilized for simulation.
Machine learning methods are described in Section 3. In Section 4, the proposed approach is
detailed, and in Section 5 the proposed method is examined by different case studies, with
the results of the simulations being illustrated as well. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. Methods
This section firstly presents the generator model of the power system and then de-
scribes attack models.
2.1. DSE and the Generator Model
The procedure for estimating the dynamic state of a power system is relatively well
known and can be found in many related articles [12,18,23–26]. The relationship between
the system’s dynamic states and the measurements is formulated as follows:{
xk+1 = f (xk, uk, vk)
yk+1 = h(xk+1, uk+1, wk)
(1)
where x is the vector containing the states of the system, y is the measurements vector, u
refers to the control vector, v is the process noise, w represents the measurement noise, and
k is the number of iterations. Both h and f are non-linear state and measurement functions,
illustrated in (3) and (4). It is worth noting that in this article, we assume that x, y, and u
are shaped as follows. 
x = {δ, ω}
y = {Pe, Pm, ωy, U, ϕ }
u =
{
E f , Tm
} (2)
where δ, ω are the rotor angle and rotor speed, respectively. ωy is the measurement
of the rotor speed, Pe is the electrical power of the generator, and Pm is the mechanical
input power of a generator. U and ϕ represent the voltage magnitude and phase angle
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of the respective bus, E f is the field voltage of the synchronous generator, and Tm is the
mechanical torque derived from the governor.
The fourth-order transient swing equations are formulated below [12,18,23–26].
.

























TJ represents the inertia time constant, while Te is the electromagnetic torque, and D
is the damping coefficient. Xd and Xq are d-axis and q-axis reactances, respectively, while
X′d and X′q are d-axis and q-axis transient reactances. T′d0 and T′q0 are d-axis and q-axis
transient time constants. id, iq are d-axis and q-axis output currents and E′d, E′q are d-axis
and q-axis voltages of a generator.


















where δy is the measurement of the rotor angle, and Pye is the measurement of the electrical power.
Both E f and Tm are control features that can be obtained from governor and exciter
models depending on the power utility, and in both IEEE 9-bus and IEEE 14-bus systems,
the power utilities are assumed to be steam power plants. For the random noises, v
along with w were calculated by random value generation ranging from “Gaussian” to
“Central Limit”.
In this article, two different Kalman filters for the forecasting and filtering stages are
proposed to improve the speed and accuracy of the DSE. Kalman filtering is an algorithm
that estimates some unknown variables taking into account the observed measurements
over time. Kalman filters have proven themselves in a wide variety of applications, are
relatively simple and easy to use, and require little computing power. The primary aim of
employing Kalman filters in our study is to make use of the minimization ability of both
EKF and UKF in a non-linear space to reduce the covariance of the squared error between
estimated and real states. Both of the aforementioned filters take different approaches
to accomplishing this task. Both EKF and UKF formulations can be found in [27], and
the two final stages of DSE in this paper, i.e., forecasting and filtering, are based on these.
Figure 1 depicts the DSE procedure with the addition of EKF and UKF.
2.2. Attack Models
Cyber-criminals can easily manipulate the DSE process by changing the measurement
data-driven by PMUs. Numerous attacking scenarios can be obtained in cyber-enhanced
sabotage, particularly in dynamic situations ranging from FDI and DoS to spoofing attacks.
Malfunctions and bad data frequently cause disasters and significantly impact the power
network’s monitoring system, which should be held accountable for the grid’s smooth
operation. This section goes over two different attack scenarios. Figure 2 depicts a brief
summary of how cyber-attacks are carried out on power grids.
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2.2.1. FDI Attack
Assume the state vector derived from Kalman filters as x = [x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn]T, in
which n is the number of states and the measurement vector as y = [y1, y2, y3, . . . , ym]
T ,
where m is the number of measurements. The invader targets measurements for the FDI
attack because the DSE is highly vulnerable to PMUs records and can be easily manipulated
by incorrect data. As shown in (1), measurements are dependent on states and the control
vector, so the residual definition can be written as follows:
ε = y− h(xk+1, uk+1, wk) (5)
in which ε is the residual repr senting the difference between the measured value nd the
calculated value. It is worth n ting that in t e optimum situation, the residual is a efinite
zero. Assume the attack vector as A = [A1, A2, A3, . . . , Am]
T . The residual under the
FDI attack can be calculated as follows:
ε = y + A− h(xk+1, uk+1, wk) (6)
The outcome of the process is an incorrect x which will significantly impact operators
for making decisive decisions and may also lead to power outages. In conclusion, while it
has the shape of A, the attack has succeeded, and the system states are going to be inaccurate,
as illustrated in Figure 3. The subplot in Figure 3 shows how the true measurements are
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changing under the FDI attack. As it is illustrated in the mentioned figure, some of the
measurements randomly increase or decrease.
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2.2.2. DoS Attack
This attack is based on data loss, and it can mislead operators by disrupting communi-
cation between PMUs and data centers, resulting in power system failures, such as black-
outs. A DoS attack can be simulated in a variety of ways, and the Bernoulli distribution [24]
method is considered in this article. DoS attacks can be carried out at various intervals or
concurrently during the grid’s transient time. Assume that y = [y1, y2, y3, . . . , ym]
T is
the measurement vector in which m is the number of measurements. The interval of DoS
attack is assumed to be a vector named tD, and the attack lasts until tDk, so the time vector
is tD = [tD0, tD1, tD2, . . . , tDk]. By employing a Bernoulli distribution, the attack vector






and i ∈ [tD0, tDk] while the var(A(i)) = 1.
The DoS attack will result in a new measurement vector named yA. The attacked
measurement vector is formulated as follows:
yA = A× y (8)
As in (6), the ε after the DoS attack is going to be calculated as:
ε = yA − h(xk+1, uk+1, wk) (9)
or
ε = A× y− h(xk+1, uk+1, wk) (10)
Therefore, by twisting the measured data, DSE will fail to estimate the true states,
and operators will be manipulated by the wrong information delivered by DSE at several
different times (within tD). In Figure 4, the mechanism of the DoS attack is illustrated. The
subplot in Figure 4 shows how the true measurements change under the FDI attack. As it
is illustrated in the mentioned figure, some of the measurements, depending on Bernoulli’s
probability, become zeros.
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3. I- s et s
In t is rticle, s er ised learning ethod, , s r is t , ,
are e ployed to facilitate the detecting and eliminating process.
3.1. Hierarchical Clustering
HC is a broad category of clustering algorithms that construct nested clusters by
successively merging or splitting them. This cluster hierarchy is portrayed as a tree (or
dendrogram). The tree’s root is a single cluster that collects all of the samples, while the
leaves are clusters with just one sample [28], making the HC a suitable method for detecting
the cyber-attack performed in a power system with various sample data derived from
PMUs. In this article, the agglomerative type of HC is employed, which is a bottom-up
approach. Each discovery begins in its cluster, and when one progresses up the hierarchy,
pairs of clusters are combined. Figure 5 represents the dendrogram of agglomerative HC.
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The distance metrics for HC range from the Euclidean distance to the Mahalanobis
distance. The most common distance metric for agglomerative clustering is the Euclidean
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where d is the distance metric.
3.2. Decision Tree
Decision trees are a non-parametric supervised learning method for classification
and regression tasks [29]. The goal is to learn basic decision rules from data features to
construct a model for prediction. Used at the elimination stage, DTR is employed as a
prediction method to prevent the manipulation of the operators and the upcoming disasters.
A supervised learning technique requires labeled data to train the model with, and, for
that purpose, we simulated numerous dynamic events and trained the tree regressor with
different non-attacked data. DTR can work with time series and continuous values such
as those we are facing in the power networks, making this method well suited for this
purpose [30]. DTR does not necessarily require pre-scaling or pre-processing of data, which
is useful in the case of generators’ angles as the angle is forecasted in degree. Missing
values in the power system data also do not affect the process of building a decision tree
to any considerable extent. Last but not least, DTR prevents overfitting and boosts the
speed of the learning process compared to other methods. Assume a training data set
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the model is not sensitive to noise. The predicted value for test data x′ is calculated as












and the standard deviation can be formulated as below:
σ =
√




Both machine learning methods mentioned in the last section are employed to spot
and eliminate cyber-attacks. For tackling the cyber-sabotage problem in the power system,
a modified version of HC is employed. The main idea behind this approach is to identify
the anomalous data and eliminate them and reduce the features used as input to the DTR so
that the algorithm predicts the correct states of the system. The challenge of the proposed
method is to maintain the high accuracy of its predicted states (rotor angle and rotor
mechanical speed), and reducing the dimension of the main features exerts a pervasive
influence on the accuracy of this method. The main features chosen in this work are
as follows.
f ea = [Pm, U, ϕ, ωz] (15)
Energies 2021, 14, 5823 9 of 21






‖si − µc(i)‖ (16)
While si is the ith sample, the cluster centroids are µc, m is the number of clusters, and
c = [1, 2, 3, . . . , k].
HC is a vital tool for detecting anomalies, and when data is far from other tree roots or
leaves, it is usually clustered as an outlier with respect to the threshold set for the method.
Therefore, for each measurement type, voltage, speed, etc., an HC algorithm will be utilized
to detect the attacked data. As the data derived from PMUs are flowing, the HC accepts
the new data and starts clustering. If the data is clustered as an outlier, the algorithm will
send it to the DTR, and the regression method replaces the data by using other features
and predicts the real value of the attacked data, and then the predicted value will be sent to
the DSE, while HC will delete the attacked data from its database. If not an outlier, the data
will be sent directly to the DSE for state estimating purposes. We need an impurity metric
appropriate for continuous variables to use a decision tree for regression, so we define the
impurity measure using the children’s leaves’ weighted mean squared error (MSE) [31].






ât = 1/Nt ∑
i ∈ Dt
a(i) (18)
where Nt is the number of samples at the leave t, while Dt is the training subset, a(i) is the
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where N is the number of samples while x̂i and xitrue are estimated and true states, re-
spectively. Sa and Sad are the number of the attacked data and detected attacked data,
respectively. Mc is the number of Monte-Carlo replications, which in this article is set to
be 100. T and t0 are the end and the starting time of the period in which the cyber-attack
was launched, respectively. It is clear that the first index is able to evaluate the estimation
results, while the second one is the attack classification ratio. The last index represents the
least squared error measure.
5. Simulation and Results
Here, the proposed method was tested on the IEEE 3-machine 9-bus system and the
IEEE 5-machine 14-bus system, while the data of these test systems are derived by using
the MATLAB power system toolbox [32] and the EKF and UKF methods are from the
EKF/UKF toolbox [33]. All tests are conducted with MATLAB 2020a and Python 3.8. A
sudden load fluctuation happened in 0.1 and lasted for 1 s in both test systems. The PMU
sample rate is 120 samples per second, and a PMU is utilized at each generator bus.
Two case studies are represented in this article, and various cyber-attacks are employed
for the simulation process. Both FDI and DoS attacks are simulated with different attack
vectors and probabilities as illustrated in Table 2. It is worth noting that the base rotor
speed is 376.8 rad/sec for both case studies, and the base generator angle is 1 degree.
The cyber-attacks were launched over t = 4.2 s and exerted a significant influence on the
DSE. The HC has clustered all the features simultaneously by taking the distortion level
of features into account, and the DTR was held responsible for clearing the attack and
correcting the states. It is worth noting that the DTR was trained by numerous data from
different contingencies ranging from three-phase fault to lightning stroke, all of which are
available on a MATLAB power system’s toolbox named PSAT [34].
Table 2. Illustrates seven different attack scenarios.
Attack Scenarios State Attack Vectors Standard Deviation Packet Loss Rate
FDI–first scenario N(0, σ), σ = 0.0001 ×
FDI–second scenario N(0, σ), σ = 0.001 ×
FDI–third scenario N(0, σ), σ = 0.01 ×
DoS–first scenario × 1
DoS–second scenario × 0.95
DoS–third scenario × 0.85
DoS–fourth scenario × 0.75
In the three scenarios of FDI cyber-attack, the “Normal Distribution” is employed
with different standard deviations for simulating the attacks [35]. In DoS cases, a “Packet
Loss Ratio” is utilized for simulating the DoS attack process with four different intensities.
Figure 7 shows the schematic of the IEEE 3-machine 9-bus and IEEE 5-machine 14-bus
systems. The whole simulation time is about 10 s, while the distortion constant is set to
10 for the IEEE 9-bus and 30 for the IEEE 14-bus. Figure 8 illustrates the first generator’s
states derived from the DSE, aided by EKF, UKF, and the proposed method under the
three FDI cyber-attack scenarios. Figure 9 shows the dynamic states of the mentioned
Energies 2021, 14, 5823 11 of 21
generator calculated by DSE under DoS cyber-sabotages for the IEEE 3-machine 9-bus
test system.
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From Figure 8a–c, it is clear that the proposed method boosted the accuracy of the 
DSE, especially during the time of FDI cyber-attacks, a task in which both EKF and UKF 
performed poorly. It is worth noting that before the cyber-attack, all three methods accu-
rately estimated the dynamic states of the network. After the cyber-attack was launched, 
however, Kalman filters failed to detect and eliminate the attacks. The situation deterio-
rates in the case of DoS attacks. From (a) to (d) subplots of Figure 9, it can be observed that 
the mentioned filters almost failed to eliminate the attacks, while the proposed DTR-based 
method properly detected and eliminated the attack vectors. 
In Figure 10a, an example of an attacked dataset detected by the HC method is illus-
trated, while in Figure 10b, a feature is shown which is not attacked. Both of the mentioned 
figures are heatmaps plotted by scatter function in Python with “cmap” set to cool. The 
former is the rotor speed of the second generator, and the latter is the voltage angle of bus 
three. Figure 11a,b shows the clustering inertia of both mentioned features. The accuracy 
of the proposed method significantly depends on the accurate functioning of the cluster-
ing method, which diagnoses malfeatures. 
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r i r 8a–c, it is clear that the proposed ethod booste the accuracy of the
, es i ll i t ti f I c er-attac s, a task in hich both E F and KF
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r t l sti t t i st t s f t e et r . ft r t r- tt l ,
ever, Kalman filters failed to detect and eliminate the attacks. The situation deteriorates
in the case of DoS attacks. From (a) to (d) subplots of Figure 9, it can be observed that t e
mentioned filters almost failed to eliminate the attacks, while the proposed DTR-based
ethod properly detected and eli inated the attack vectors.
In Figure 10a, an example of an attacked dataset detected by the HC method is
illustrated, while in Figure 10b, a feature is shown which is not attacked. Both of the
mentioned figures are heatmaps plotted by scatter function in Python with “cmap” set to
cool. The former is the rotor speed of the second generator, and the latter is the voltage
angle of bus three. Figure 11a,b shows the clustering inertia of both mentioned features.
The accuracy of the proposed method significantly depends on the accurate functioning of
the clustering method, which diagnoses malfeatures.
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Scenarios Index [7] This Article 
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Figure 11. (a) Clustering inertia for the rotor speed of the second generator in IEEE 9-bus system under the FDI attack;
(b) clustering inertia for the voltage angle of the third bus in IEEE 9-bus system under the FDI attack.
The roposed indices are calcul ted nd compared to nother related study in Tables 3 and 4
und r different attack scena ios in he IEEE 3-machine 9-bus test system. It is worth noting that
he method proposed in [12] is RCKF.
From Figure 11a,b, it is clear that as soon as the attacked measurement of rotor speed
ent rs the HC, the distortion of nly one cluster boosts rapidly, and the inj cted data is
eliminated, while all of the voltage angle data are correct and the distortion for only one
cluster is smaller than d. The second index has the same value for both rotor speed and
angle, as it measures the detecting accuracy of HC and does not depend on any individual
features. By taking the first index into account, the proposed method works slightly better
than that of [12], which shows the higher accuracy of the proposed method.
From Tables 3 and 4, it can be seen that the HC-DTR-based dynamic state estimation
outperforme the RCKF technique. The HC model managed to detect the attacked data
better than the Kalman filter algorithm, and the DTR predicted the actual values more
robustly than the method conducted in [12].
Figure 12 illustrates the generator’s states in the IEEE 5-machine 14-bus under three dif-
ferent FDI attack scenarios, while Figure 13 shows the generator’s states under DoS attack
scenarios. In this test system, only UKF was employed as an alternative method due to the
low accuracy of EKF.
Energies 2021, 14, 5823 14 of 21
Table 3. Indices calculated for the rotor angle of the first generator in IEEE 9-bus system.
Scenarios Index [12] This Article
First FDI scenario
τ1 6.0998 × 105 5.4721 × 105
τ2 × 0.9372
τ3 × 4.7548 × 106
Second FDI scenario
τ1 6.4476 × 105 5.8539 × 105
τ2 × 0.9421
τ3 × 5.4152 × 106
Third FDI scenario
τ1 6.8111 × 105 6.1836 × 105
τ2 × 0.9723
τ3 × 6.6205 × 106
First DoS scenario
τ1 1.6683 × 104 1.3721 × 104
τ2 × 0.9936
τ3 × 1.0665 × 105
Second DoS scenario
τ1 1.6640 × 104 1.4380 × 104
τ2 × 0.9632
τ3 × 2.4792 × 105
Third DoS scenario
τ1 1.6549 × 104 1.5779 × 104
τ2 × 0.9248
τ3 × 3.6721 × 105
Fourth DoS scenario
τ1 1.6378 × 104 1.6035 × 104
τ2 × 0.8931
τ3 × 4.9620 × 105
Table 4. Indices calculated for the rotor speed of the first generator in IEEE 9-bus system.
Scenarios Index [7] This Article
First FDI scenario
τ1 1.5821 × 105 1.2395 × 105
τ2 × 0.9372
τ3 × 2.1442 × 108
Second FDI scenario
τ1 1.5841 × 105 1.3254 × 105
τ2 × 0.9421
τ3 × 6.5948 × 108
Third FDI scenario
τ1 1.5969 × 105 1.4837 × 105
τ2 × 0.9723
τ3 × 9.9827 × 108
First DoS scenario
τ1 1.5626 × 105 1.1147 × 105
τ2 × 0.9936
τ3 × 1.9546 × 107
Second DoS scenario
τ1 1.5619 × 105 1.2759 × 105
τ2 × 0.9632
τ3 × 4.2756 × 107
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Table 4. Cont.
Scenarios Index [7] This Article
Third DoS scenario
τ1 1.5612 × 105 1.4738 × 105
τ2 × 0.9248
τ3 × 6.9563 × 107
Fourth DoS scenario
τ1 1.5604 × 105 1.5392 × 105
τ2 × 0.8931
τ3 × 1.6383 × 106
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angle and angular frequency of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the FDI attack scenario 3.
As it is clear from Figure 12, the proposed machine learning-based method’s accuracy
is far better than the UKF’s, even in more extensive scenarios under FDI attacks. Similar to
the previous cyber-attack, it is clear from Figure 13 that the DoS attack is well detected and
eliminated by the proposed method, a task in which the UKF has failed. The DTR method
shows considerable potential in eliminating different cyber-attacks, as illustrated in the
mentioned figures for both the IEEE 3-machine 9-bus test system and the IEEE 5-machine
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14-bus test system. Figure 14 illustrates the rotor speed’s data of the second generator and
voltage angle’s data of the third bus as attacked and the true features. Both mentioned
figures are heatmaps plotted by scatter function in Python with “cmap” set to warm, while
Figure 15 shows the cluster inertia of both features. It is worth noting that the HC method
is clustering the data simultaneously, which is vitally essential for rapid response against
cyber-attacks.
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Figure 13. (a) Rotor angle and angular frequency of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the DoS attack scenario 
1; (b) rotor angle and angular frequency of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the DoS attack scenario 2; (c) 
i re 13. (a) t r a le a a lar fre e c f the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the DoS attack scenario 1;
(b) rotor angle and angular frequency of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the DoS attack scenario 2; (c) rotor
angle and angular frequency of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the DoS attack scenario 3; (d) rotor angle
and angular frequency of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system under the DoS attack scenario 4.
The proposed indices are illustrated in Tables 5 and 6 for rotor angle and rotor speed,
respectively, and compared to results from two other related studies [36,37], for the IEEE
5-machine 14-bus test system. It is worth mentioning that [36] proposed a non-linear
method based on a novel Kalman filter for detecting and eliminating the FDI attack,
while [37] employed a support vector machine classification-based method for diagnosing
the DoS attack.
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erator and voltage angle’s data of the third bus as attacked and the true features. Both 
entioned figures are heat aps plotted by scatter function in Python ith “c ap” set to 
ar , hile Figure 15 sho s the cluster inertia of both features. It is orth noting that 
the  ethod is clustering the data si ultaneously, hich is vitally essential for rapid 
response against cyber-attacks. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 14. (a) Rotor speed of the second generator in IEEE 14-bus syste  under the DoS attack; (b) voltage angle of the 
third bus in IEEE 14-bus syste . 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 15. (a) Clustering inertia for the rotor speed of the second generator in IEEE 14-bus syste  under the DoS attack; 
(b) clustering inertia for the voltage angle of the third bus in IEEE 14-bus syste . 
The proposed indices are illustrated in Tables 5 and 6 for rotor angle and rotor speed, 
respectively, and co pared to results fro  t o other related studies [36,37], for the IEEE 
5- achine 14-bus test syste . It is orth entioning that [36] proposed a non-linear 
ethod based on a novel al an filter for detecting and eli inating the F I attack, hile 
[37] e ployed a support vector achine classification-based ethod for diagnosing the 
oS attack. 
i i ertia for the rotor spe d of the second generator in IEEE 14-bus sy tem under the DoS attack; (b)
clustering i ertia for the voltage angle of the ird bus in IEEE 14-bus sy tem.
Table 5. Indices calculated for the rotor ngle of the fir t ge erator in IEEE 14-bus system.
Scenarios Index [36] [37] This Article
First FDI scenari
τ1 × × 6.2471 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9163
τ3 × × 1.5728 × 106
Second FDI scenario
τ1 × × 9.4638 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9274
τ3 × × 1.6371 × 106
Third FDI scenario
τ1 × × 1.2532 × 104
τ2 × × 0.9355
τ3 2.4920 × 104 × 1.7814 × 106
First DoS scenario
τ1 × × 8.9060 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9997
τ3 × × 1.5406 × 106
Second DoS scenario
τ1 × × 9.7987 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9723
τ3 × × 1.6086 × 106
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Table 5. Cont.
Scenarios Index [36] [37] This Article
Third DoS scenario
τ1 × × 1.0614 × 104
τ2 × × 0.9491
τ3 × × 1.6796 × 106
Fourth DoS scenario
τ1 × × 1.3000 × 104
τ2 × 0.9079 0.9186
τ3 × × 2.2414 × 106
Table 6. Indices calculated for the rotor speed of the first generator in IEEE 14-bus system.
Scenarios Index [36] [37] This Article
First FDI scenario
τ1 × × 2.1461 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9163
τ3 × × 1.2362 × 107
Second FDI scenario
τ1 × × 3.6921 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9274
τ3 × × 1.5036 × 107
Third FDI scenario
τ1 × × 3.9251 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9355
τ3 8 × 106 × 1.4270 × 107
First DoS scenario
τ1 × × 2.3250 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9997
τ3 × × 5.7519 × 107
Second DoS scenario
τ1 × × 3.7969 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9723
τ3 × × 6.5682 × 107
Third DoS scenario
τ1 × × 3.8801 × 105
τ2 × × 0.9491
τ3 × × 6.7121 × 107
Fourth DoS scenario
τ1 × × 4.0986 × 105
τ2 × 0.9079 0.9186
τ3 × × 7.0902 × 107
It is clear from Tables 5 and 6 that the proposed method possesses better detection
accuracy in the case of DoS attacks than that of [36] and more accuracy for estimating the
dynamic states of the case study than that of [37]. Other indices illustrate that the proposed
method is fully capable of eliminating DoS and FDI cyber-attacks and simply outperforms
other mentioned techniques in [36,37].
6. Conclusions
A two-stage machine learning-based method was proposed in this paper to tackle
the cyber-sabotage issue in the smart grid by clustering data using an HC method and
regressing with DTR to eliminate the attack. This paper contributes to the area of DSE
in power networks by using an unsupervised learning method for attack detection and
an ensemble learning method for attack elimination. This novel technique was capable
of detecting and eliminating cyber-attacks and tracking the dynamic states of the power
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system, which can provide significant help to human operators to prevent them from
making wrong decisions during the transient time in the power system operation. The
proposed method carried out the given tasks better than previous methods based on
the traditional Kalman filter and support vector machines. By correctly diagnosing the
attack vectors, the proposed method provides the operators with accurate state estimations,
decreasing the risk of blackouts or other disasters due to wrong commands. However,
the full efficiency of the proposed method is yet to be tested in a large-scale power grid
network, and the cost for this was not considered in the present study. Our future work will
also focus on developing effective methods for distinguishing between faults, cyber-attacks,
damaged PMUs, and measurement noise in power networks.
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Abbreviations
AI Artificial Intelligence
CKF Cubature Kalman Filter
DoS Denial of Service
DSE Dynamic State Estimation
DTR Decision Tree Regressor
EKF Extended Kalman Filter
FDI False Data Injection
HC Hierarchical Clustering
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
RCKF Robust Cubature Kalman Filter
UKF Unscented Kalman Filter
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